Framework Guidance for Synthetic DoubleStranded DNA Providers" released in November 2009 (ref. 3) .
Comments were solicited from representatives of the US government agencies, gene-synthesis provider organizations and the biotech and in Washington, DC, at the request of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the US Department of State, focused on the government's perspective on minimizing the risk of synthetic biology and critiqued the recent DHHS draft set of voluntary guidelines entitled "Screening To the Editor: A letter in your January issue highlights the need for harmonizing biosecurity oversight for gene synthesis 1 . The US government is currently preparing to publish its final, formal 'guidelines' on the procedures at DNA synthesis companies for screening incoming orders for sequences of potential dual-use concern. As the research community continues to debate the promise and risks of synthetic biology, we report here discussions at two major synthetic biology conferences with important implications for safe and effective progress within the field.
The 2009 National Academies Keck Futures Initiative on Synthetic Biology (NAKFI-SB) took place in Irvine, California, on November 19-22 and convened more than 160 experts to explore the engineering, scientific and social impact of synthetic biology. Participants were asked to consider such basic questions as what tools and technologies are required to advance the field, why man-made biologic systems are more fragile than natural ones and how to create and improve intercellular communication. Discussions also covered risk assessments, the religious and ethical implications of synthetic biology and how best to leverage the technologies to explore other biological systems.
Although the primary focus of NAKFI-SB was to discuss future research and promote interdisciplinary cooperation, the significant inherent risks and potential bioethical implications of synthetic biology were recognized by attendees. In terms of risk assessment, the NAKFI-SB discussions focused on the value of revisiting the selfexamination and self-regulation imposed on early adopters of recombinant DNA technology at the Asilomar meeting 2 in light of the increased complexity and ambitious goals for synthetic biology. Attendees also recognized the need for a 'safety switch' to disable undesirable 'neoorganisms' ( Table 1) .
A second meeting, convened by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy on January 11
Safe and effective synthetic biology Table 1 Summary of deliberations at NAKFI-SB meeting
Question Response
What is needed to facilitate synthetic biology?
• Integration of biological vocabulary within computer programming.
• Improved analytical and design modeling.
• Novel cellular monitoring techniques.
• Improved screening technologies.
• Enhanced cell lines to improve productivity.
• Cheaper technology.
• Techniques to create complex entities.
• 'Fail-safe' systems.
• A 'kill switch' for neo-organisms.
What are the bioethical considerations?
• Synthetic biology is similar, but not identical, to other genetic engineering techniques.
• Implications require regulatory oversight.
• Novel ethical issues necessitate specific risk-benefit evaluation.
• Ongoing public communication and input is vital.
Is synthetic biology useful as an investigative modality?
• Can be used to evaluate intracellular systems.
• Would require advances in current technology, but that is expected.
• A sharable library of results is essential but that requires standardization of a context-sensitive archiving format.
Is synthetic biology useful for multicellular systems?
• Can be used to evaluate extra-cellular communication and integration.
• Could create novel tissues, organs and complete organisms.
How do we make synthetic systems as stable as natural ones?
• Integrate redundancy.
• Increase adaptability.
• Improve evaluation techniques.
Is synthetic biology useful for multiorganism systems?
• Can evaluate inter-organism interaction.
• Can search for unique genetic material.
• Requires improved database administration.
Are there alternatives to using genes within synthetic biology?
• Chemical and physical interactions can be used to modify biological reactions.
• Unique nongenetic compounds can be developed to influence outcomes.
• Alternative engineering techniques (e.g., application of computer design tools) will likely improve results.
• Create novel methods for system interfaces and interactions (e.g., optical inputs and outputs).
• Isolate created functions from natural processes (e.g., create synthetic organelles or 'subroutines').
Is it important that synthetic biologic systems 'evolve'?
• Provides adaptability.
• Improved modeling would be valuable.
• Need techniques to speed up process to be useful.
What is required to fulfill the potential of synthetic biology?
• Enhanced education opportunities at all levels.
• Improved and consistent public education and communication.
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e systems, including enhanced redundancy and adaptability as characterized by a capacity to evolve to improve efficacy. In terms of applications, participants suggested that synthetic biology is likely to be employed in the evaluation and synthesis of more complex biological systems in the coming years and to progress beyond using single genes to create more complex gene circuits with mechanisms that regulate these novel systems.
As the AAAS meeting was convened to comment on proposed US governmental safety regulations, the recommendations were understandably narrower. The importance
The two conferences provided two contrasting perspectives on the field. NAKFI-SB was a broad evaluation of the current status of synthetic biology and the final recommendations focused on methods to advance the field. Besides outlining some technical improvements currently needed to improve productivity, the participants recognized the paramount importance of public communication and of lay participation in regulation and oversight to address potential bioethical issues. They also advocated specific technological steps to improve the stability of engineered biological pharmaceutical industries as well as biosecurity experts and academics industry players and other concerned parties (a summary of the meeting's main themes can be found elsewhere 4 and is summarized in Table 2 ). As expected from the diverse nature of the participants, some of the concerns raised were contradictory, but the conference deliberations were constructive in providing the perspective of the major companies involved in commercial gene synthesis and highlighting perceived weaknesses within the current strategy for verifying sequences of potential concern. Table 2 Summary of deliberations at AAAS meeting 4 
Theme
Comments Recommendation DHHS guidance • May inhibit competition and innovation.
• How will proprietary information be protected?
• No mechanism for 'garage biology' oversight.
• No mechanism for DNA providers to share customer information.
• No ongoing, updated database of entities prohibited from obtaining synthetic biology technology.
• DNA providers may refuse to fill orders for sequences that require additional expenses to participate in oversight programs.
• No oversight of synthesis providers to assure security and safety.
• Although the purchase of synthesis technology is a private transaction, there is a lack of an established appeal process for refused orders.
• Coordinate customer and sequence screening to assure safety and security across all DNA providers.
• Provide a mechanism to assure safety and security of synthetic biology technology providers.
• Enhance accountability of all aspects of synthetic biology including reporting and appeal mechanisms.
Customer screening • No mechanism to determine who is the end user of technology.
• Costs associated with compliance may be prohibitory.
• Supply precise customer screening modalities and criteria to assure safety and security.
• Shift some compliance requirements from providers to customer institutions, including 'Biosafety Committee-like' review boards.
• Compile, review and update a database of approved customers and consider a licensing requirement to allow purchase of synthetic biology technology.
Sequence search methodology
• Automated reviews of DNA sequences are inadequate.
• Screening against a list does not consider the possible context of use since 'sequence does not necessarily predict function'.
• Innovation and discovery would be inhibited if orders are limited to previously described sequences.
• Mandatory reporting of DNA sequence orders may compromise proprietary information.
• Cannot identify sequences changed by end users.
• 'Best match' determinations that search for sequences that are more similar to harmful than nonharmful patterns are better than 'thresholds' but may be below current industry standards.
• Labeling a sequence as potentially 'of concern' does not determine actual harmful nature.
• Proprietary screening software is inadequate.
• 200 bp minimum size for sequence screening is inadequate.
• Human review of all sequence orders.
• Compile, review and update a database of harmful sequences.
• Promote research to determine the fundamentals of harmful sequences and use this information for screening.
• Create and promote protocols for sequence screening 'best practices'.
• Establish list of subject matter experts for each potentially harmful select agent.
• Screen each order against any potentially harmful sequence not just those on select agent and commercial control lists.
• Mandate the use of open-source screening software that is continuously updated.
• Screen all orders irrespective of sequence length.
Implementation and evaluation
• Success is determined by degree of implementation.
• The costs of implementation are minimal when compared with other costs of doing business.
• Regulatory compliance is difficult to determine.
• Ongoing, regular governmental communication and interaction with industry and research institutions is critical.
• Models of illegal and noncompliance methods should be used to evaluate screening modalities.
• Screening methods require continuous governmental and industry evaluations of effectiveness.
• Screening methods require ongoing evaluation of financial impact on industry.
• Effectiveness can be determined in part by the number of providers that claim compliance with regulations and by the number that perform follow-up screening.
• DNA providers should be certified.
International engagement • Voluntary compliance and cooperation is crucial to assure safety and security.
• Coordinate and streamline international screening of sequences, customers and industry providers.
C O R R E S P O N D E N C E
proactively reduce the risk of potential misuse of the technology are substantially less than the estimated costs to respond to a biological disaster. Safety must be designed into the system and not become a secondary concern. In this respect, the attempt to shift the oversight burden from the gene manufacturers to their customers through the creation of institutional 'biosafety review boards' modeled after institutional animal care and use committees is likely to be problematic as it would further decentralize the review process and rely on committee structures that were not designed to preemptively detect hazardous modalities. The AAAS 4 and NAKFI-SB 5 meetings were an excellent starting point for debate and we strongly recommend that the discussions be expanded and that the subsequent safety recommendations become expeditiously implemented.
of improved oversight along the entire chain of production within synthetic biology was emphasized. Increased oversight included improvements in customer and end-product screening modalities and greater cooperation between governments, industry and academics both within the US and elsewhere. Some of the AAAS participants noted that the increased financial burden required to comply with these regulations may impede private industry's investment in the technology.
Discussions at both conferences recognized that the promise of synthetic biology is associated with the potential for significant harm. There is a need to prepare for malicious acts using purely synthetic or hybrid synthetic and/or natural neoorganisms. Additionally, strategies should be in place to predict and prevent such events and to trace the source of such materials should they surface. Current prevention efforts rely on voluntary participation in a software-based matching system that checks orders against select agent sequences to head off the commercial synthesis of select agent genes, but, as the AAAS report details 4 , that system could be improved.
In addition, it is imperative to identify a strong method to label synthetic genes so they can readily be identified as such. Unencrypted watermarks have already been reported in published sequences of synthetic genes (http:// www.wired.com/wiredscience/2008/01/ venter-institut/). Although such watermarks are feasible, currently there is a lack of regulatory controls against surreptitious insertions of sequence; synthetic genes can be tagged with DNA encoding natural amino acids, but the ability to remove, modify or even counterfeit such sequences using conventional molecular biology tools suggests that more robust strategies will be needed. One potential solution would be to create a 'serial number' that could be traced back to individual synthesis laboratories or even individual synthesis machines, and encoded into the synthetic gene using an appropriate combination of public-key and private-key hash algorithms.
Going forward, public-private cooperation will be vital for safe and effective progress within synthetic biology and to ensure that the field is not restrained by public fears. There must be a concerted effort to minimize the expense associated with regulatory compliance; however, the inherent risks of synthetic biology mandate rigorous oversight especially because the burdens of a major 'accident' will be borne by the public.
The financial expenditures that companies synthesizing genes will have to bear to The regulatory bottleneck for biotech specialty crops To the Editor: Specialty crops, which include fruits, vegetables, nuts, turf and ornamental crops, are important components of human diets and provide environmental amenities 1 . In 2007, such crops represented ~40% of the $140 billion in total agricultural receipts, despite being cultivated on just 4% of the total cropped area 2 . Although tomato was the first genetically modified (GM) food crop to be commercialized in 1994, the only GM specialty crop traits currently marketed are virus-resistant papaya and squash, insect-resistant sweet corn and violet carnations. All of these received initial regulatory approval over 10 years ago. As a group, GM specialty crops have garnered limited market share (the exception is GM papaya resistant to papaya ringspot virus 1 , which now produces 90% of Hawaii's crop). In contrast, GM field crops, such as soybean, maize, cotton and canola, have come to dominate the markets in countries where they have been released 3 . What is responsible for this disparity in the commercialization of GM field crops versus specialty crops?
One possibility is that the dearth of GM specialty crops indicates a lack of current research or of beneficial traits for crop improvement through genetic engineering. Alternatively, research may have continued but progression through the regulatory process to the marketplace may have failed. Anticipated lack of market acceptance could have stopped either research or regulatory submissions. To find out why specialty crops with GM traits have fared so poorly, we have analyzed the research, regulatory and market pipeline to determine which steps in the process may be responsible for the limited range of commercially available products.
To assess the recent research and development pipeline for GM specialty crops, an extensive search was conducted on a global scale for scientific journal articles, describing work in specialty crops using recombinant DNA (transgenic) methods, published between January 2003 and October 2008 (Supplementary Table 1 ). In most cases, these reports demonstrate proof of concept of the effectiveness of the transgene in producing the phenotypic trait in the species studied. Among 313 published articles on specialty crops, 46 species were represented, of which tobacco, potato and tomato accounted for 59% of the total reports, in part due to their use as easily transformed

